Adopting the euro will cause an increase in prices : a study on inflationary processes in euro area member states by Nowaczyk, Piotr & Hernik, Joanna
European Research Studies Journal 
Volume XXIII, Issue 4, 2020   
 pp. 377-403 
  
 Adopting the Euro will Cause an Increase in Prices:  
A Study on Inflationary Processes in Euro Area Member 
States     
Submitted 11/08/20, 1st revision 02/09/20, 2nd revision 11/10/20, accepted 21/10/20 
 
Piotr Nowaczyk1, Joanna Hernik2   
Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The main purpose of the article is to identify factors that may affect the course of 
inflation processes in Poland after the adoption of the single European currency.   
Design/Methodology/Approach: The mechanism triggering an inflationary spiral in the first 
years after the adoption of the euro was especially visible in Spain, which became the subject 
of comparative analysis. Based on literature, it was determined that the price increase in Spain 
resulted from an asymmetric demand shock. Its sources should be sought in Spain's adoption 
of a lower interest rate and in the structural features of the country’s economy.   Similarly, 
Poland’s submission to the single monetary policy regime imposed by the European Central 
Bank may affect the course of inflationary processes. This study made use of the document 
analysis, comparative analysis, and statistical analysis methods. 
Findings: Factors that may affect inflation processes in Poland after the adoption of the single 
currency will be the adoption of a lower interest rate, and expansionary fiscal policy. Lending 
policy and inflation expectations will be less likely to stimulate price increases. These factors 
may contribute to the occurrence of asymmetric shock, i.e. surplus of global demand over 
supply. Reduction of the inflation risk will require a tightening of lending and fiscal policy. 
Otherwise, the Polish economy will be exposed to the occurrence of crises.  
Practical Implications: Reflections on the importance of the single European currency in the 
course of inflation processes can be a valuable source of information for decision makers in 
preventing crisis phenomena. The more so because six Central and Eastern European 
countries have committed themselves in the Accession Treaties to the introduction of the euro 
and will face similar dilemmas.     
Originality/Value: The authors of this article draw attention to the importance of domestic 
factors in correcting inflation processes in the event of the loss of independence of national 
monetary policy.    
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1. Introduction  
 
In the 2003 Accession Treaty, Poland committed itself to adopt the single European 
currency (Domagała, 2011; Cakici et al., 2020). The only question that remained open 
was that of the deadline for the country’s monetary integration. This is to become 
possible after the so-called nominal convergence criteria have been fulfilled. 
However, Poland already does fulfill – or has fulfilled in the past – most of them, and 
thus it appears that it is the lack of political will that is the greatest obstacle on the 
path to adopting the euro. Also, public opinion polls confirm the Polish society’s 
reluctance to switch to it (Dallago, 2016; Piasecki et al., 2019). The key argument in 
favor of rejecting the idea of the monetary union revolves around the fear of an 
increase in prices and, consequently, a reduced standard of living (Thalassinos et al., 
2012). A similar situation happened immediately prior to Poland’s accession to the 
European Union (the EU) in 2003-2004. The unwarranted inflation expectations 
became a self-fulfilling prophecy, contributing to an actual growth in price levels. The 
fear of inflation is being inflated by politicians talking of a radical growth in prices 
that occurred in the euro area countries after they introduced the single currency. 
Many scientific reports do not confirm an increased level of inflation in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) at the aggregated level (Lopez et al., 2012; Meller et al., 
2012; Dallago, 2016; Drakos et al., 2020). However, despite the initial convergence, 
price differences began to grow between the member states with time (Rogers, 2007; 
Fritsche et al., 2011).  
 
Taking into account the experience gained thus far in the course of inflation processes 
in the Eurozone, the main purpose of this article is to identify the factors that may 
affect the course of inflation processes in Poland after the adoption of the common 
European currency. Referring to the purpose of the article, the authors try to answer 
the following research questions: 
  
1. Will Poland's adoption of the interest rate set by the ECB affect price growth? 
2. What will be the possibilities of correcting inflation processes with the use of the 
national lending and fiscal policy? 
3. Will the domestic labor market be able to restore the competitiveness of the 
economy during the recession?     
 
Obtaining answers to the above questions first required discussing the course of 
inflation processes in the Eurozone countries. Due to the numerous similarities to 
Poland, the focus was put on Spain. These two countries occupy a comparable area 
and their populations are of a similar size. At the beginning of its membership in the 
EMU, Spain’s economic potential and household debt were parallel to those found in 
Poland. Both the countries demonstrated price growth rates higher than the European 
average. Lastly, similarly to Spain, an intensive real-estate market growth is being 
observed in Poland, which was the origin of the crisis that Spain suffered. 
 
Price convergence in countries with different levels of economic development is a 
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normal phenomenon, resulting, among others, from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
However, in some countries, the single currency can stimulate the economy, leading 
to above-average price increases. Therefore, in this article attention was paid to the 
importance of asymmetric shocks during inflation processes. Asymmetric shocks are 
disruptions of economic processes between monetary union countries, contributing to 
the lack of adequacy of the common monetary policy. In the case of Spain, the 
asymmetric shock that contributed to the price increase (Andrés et al., 2010; 
Krugman, 2010; Nam, 2014; Álvarez et al., 2019) was an excessive increase in 
demand with simultaneous restrictions on the supply side. The growing 
macroeconomic imbalance was particularly evident on the housing market. The 
sources of asymmetric shock should be seen in the adoption of a lower interest rate, 
excessive credit expansion, high inflation expectations, and errors made in fiscal 
policy. With time, the growing prices reduced the economy’s competitiveness 
(Laborda, 2010), whereas the real estate bubble burst brought the country into a crisis. 
Moreover, the over-regulated labor market delayed any adaptation processes (Conde-
Ruiz et al., 2011; Sáez, 2011; Poggi, 2019).  
 
Demand shock analyzed in the article is not the only one to which the countries of the 
Economic and Monetary Union are exposed, but in the case of Spain it was the main 
factor contributing to the increase in inflation (García-Cintado et al., 2016). At the 
same time, properly conducted economic policy aimed at controlling the banking 
sector and implementing counter-cyclical fiscal policy may limit the price growth 
dynamics. In turn, making the labor market more flexible can accelerate the 
restoration of international competitiveness. 
 
This paper uses the comparative analysis method to assess the risk of an increase in 
prices after Poland adopts the single currency. To this effect, analogous factors that 
contributed to the emergence of asymmetric shocks and the resulting growth of 
inflation in Spain will be analyzed. 
 
Reflections on the role of the single European currency in shaping inflationary 
processes have been the subject-matter of many reports (Byrne et al., 2010; Meller et 
al., 2012; Gomez-Gonzalez et al., 2018). The Polish-language literature, as well, has 
discussed the consequences of monetary integration (NBP, 2009; BAS, 2013; 
Pietrucha, 2015; NIK, 2019). However, no wider analyses have been published 
comparing how inflationary processes develop in the euro area member states on the 
one hand and the countries that aspire to adopt the single currency on the other. 
Therefore, it appears that by creating a scenario for the development of the situation 
in Poland following the adoption of the euro this paper will bridge the gap in 
knowledge.  
 
The article consists of five interrelated parts. The first part discusses the course of 
inflation processes in the euro area countries. Particular attention was paid to countries 
with above-average price increases. The second part presents the factors that 
determined inflation processes in Spain. Next, the authors refer to the situation in 
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Poland, analyzing factors that may shape prices after the adoption of the single 
currency. In the “discussion” part, attempts were made to answer the question about 
the risk of price increases in Poland after the adoption of the euro. Recommendations 
have been presented to counteract excessive inflationary impulses. The article ends 
with a summary, in which the most important conclusions from the analysis are 
presented in a synthetic way.  
 
2. Methodological Assumptions  
 
Being able to describe the effect of the euro on the development of inflationary 
processes called for an analysis of the statistical data for 1990-2019. The temporal 
scope was divided into four sub-periods, according to the degree of advancement of 
the monetary integration process and the eurozone countries’ economic situation. 
  
1. The first sub-period from 1990 to 1993 overlapped the first stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. The economic policy of the then EU member 
states was not yet determined by the need to fulfill the convergence criteria 
provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, although the very awareness of the 
upcoming monetary integration might have had an impact on how the 
inflationary processes were developing.  
2. The second sub-period encompassing the years from 1994 to 1998 overlapped 
the second stage of the EMU. It was characterized by intensive preparations for 
monetary integration, which for many countries meant they had to pursue an 
economic policy aiming at limiting price increases.  
3. The third sub-period encompassing the years from 1999 to 2008 overlapped the 
commencement of the third stage of the EMU, which entailed the adoption of 
the single currency. Having qualified for the third stage and received a 
guarantee of adopting the single currency diminished the countries’ motivation 
to implement a strict observation of the price criterion. The subsequent years 
coincided in time with an improved economic situation. 
4. The last sub-period encompassing the years from 2009 to 2019 initially was 
characterized by the euro area countries’ struggling with the economic crisis 
accompanied by dropping prices, and then a gradual improvement in the 
economic situation. 
 
Thus, the temporal scope of 1990-2019 was selected since it comprised a certain 
sequence of events, i.e. a preparatory period, an improved economic situation 
resulting from adopting the single currency and an economic downturn, which may 
appear to accompany Poland’s monetary integration, as well. 
 
The article presents the risk of asymmetric shocks in Poland with the assumption of 
unchanged economic conditions, i.e. stable inflation, and economic situation. With 
any other assumptions, results of a similar analysis might vary. When analyzing the 
phenomenon of asymmetric shocks, Mundell’s theory of optimum currency areas was 
invoked (1961) on the foundation of which the structure of the eurozone was built. 
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According to that theory, a long-term success of monetary integration – where the 
states have been deprived of adjustment factors such as the exchange rate and the 
nominal interest rate – depends on the susceptibility of national economies to 
asymmetrical shocks. The latter, in turn, can be determined by, inter alia, inflation 
expectations and credit and fiscal policies (Frankel, 2005; Wawrzyniec, 2012; Chari 
et al., 2019). Asymmetric shocks encompass various socio-economic phenomena, 
which contribute to a considerable disruption of the economic activity if changed. 
They occur within the limited space of the currency area, curbing the adequacy of the 
current monetary policy. The economic parameters identified during asymmetric 
shocks diverge significantly from aggregate values. 
 
Due to the short timeframe of monetary integration in the new EU member states, the 
developments of inflationary processes are discussed using the examples of the 12 old 
EU member states that were the first to adopt the euro, namely Belgium (BE), 
Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), 
Luxemburg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Austria (AT), Portugal (PT) and Finland (FI). 
Accession to the European Union equals, over a period, giving up national currencies 
in favor of the single one. Presently, its purchasing power depends on many factors, 
which are discussed herein. The analytical part of the article was developed based on 
the document analysis, comparative analysis, and descriptive statistics methods. Also, 
as mentioned above, the main references are made here to Spain which, on the one 
hand, bears numerous similarities to Poland, but which, on the other hand, has gone 
its own way towards monetary integration (Carreras, 2016). 
 
3. The Inflationary Processes in the Euro Area   
 
The developments of inflationary processes between 1990 and 2019 in 12 member 
states that were the first to adopt the single European currency are shown in Figure 1. 
An analysis of the aggregate data – as mentioned in the methodological assumptions 
section above – required that four sub-periods be singled out. The first sub-period of 
1990-1993 saw a slight increase in the average price level. However, an increase in 
prices was only found in three countries. It was the most remarkable in Germany, 
which should be linked to the nation’s expansive fiscal policy that was a consequence 
of its reunification. In the remaining member states of the then EU prices remained 
similar or fell (Byrne et al., 2010; Gros et al., 201; Lopez et al., 2012; Meller et al., 
2012; Castañeda et al., 2017).  
 
The most noticeable drop in prices was observed in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, 
where inflation had been falling for some considerable time already. The price 
convergence of 1990-1993 is confirmed by the lower standard deviation values. 
However, the increase in prices at the aggregate level was caused by the higher share 
that Germany enjoyed in the inflation basket of the EU member states. 
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Figure 1. Developments of inflationary processes in the 12 EMU member states 
between 1990 and 2019 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat data.   
 
The second sub-period of 1994-1998 was characterized by a systematic and quite 
considerable price drop at the aggregated level, from 4.7% to 1.1%. Prices were 
dropping in almost all the studied countries, with the highest drop rate found – 
similarly to the previous years – in the southern member states of the EU. However, 
the latter group of countries had an easier job to do fighting inflation thanks to the 
high base they had built up in the previous periods. The convergence of inflation is 
confirmed by the value of the standard deviation, which dropped from 3.3% to a mere 
0.7%.  
 
This observable drop in prices should be linked to the necessity to fulfil the inflation 
criterion specified in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Several anti-inflation activities were 
required such as, for example, ensuring the autonomy of central banks or introducing 
a strict monetary policy, which was frequently accompanied by the tightening of the 
fiscal policy. Interestingly, in 1998 when the second stage of the EMU was nearing 
its end and the fate of any future integration hanged in the balance, all countries but 
Greece had fulfilled the inflation criterion. Greece, however, still needed to make 
some further progress in fighting inflation before it was allowed to enter the third 
stage of the EMU in 2001, whereas at the same time its inflation had reached a 
historical minimum in 1998. A lower price level in Greece would only be observed in 
the crisis year of 2009. However, it should be remembered that back in that period the 
anti-inflation processes were not only being determined by monetary integration but 
were also part of the global price growth reduction trend.  
 
The third sub-period began in 1999 and lasted until the end of the business cycle, i.e. 
2008. In 1999, the aggregate price index for the euro area was exceptionally low, but 
in 2000 it grew by 2.1%. The subsequent years saw inflation stabilize at a similar 
level, except the last year, i.e. 2008, when it reached 3.3%. The growth in prices in 
2000 could not be justified by a changed economic situation (the economic growth 
commenced in 1997 lasted uninterrupted until 2001). Therefore, a thesis may be 
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‘dropping off’ from the integration mainstream, mobilized the states in their fight 
against inflation more than any loss of public trust resulting from undertaking 
unpopular economic decisions would have. However, being qualified for the third 
stage of the EMU and winning the resulting guarantee that the single currency can be 
adopted reduced the states’ motivation to strictly observe the price convergence 
criterion. This particularly applied to the countries boasting the largest advancements 
in fighting inflation, i.e. Portugal, Spain, and Greece, but also Ireland – a country that 
had not had problems with inflation before. In principle, these countries did not fulfill 
the inflation criterion, and their price levels were above the inflation target set by the 
European Central Bank (ECB), i.e. close to but below 2% (Schönwitz, 2014).  
 
At this point, the question must be asked whether the single currency contributed to 
an increased inflation rate in the eurozone. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
paper, most research papers claim that the monetary integration pursued in the EU 
limited the increase in prices. But then, how could one explain another pick-up in 
inflation that happened between 1999 and 2008? The literature frequently discusses 
the concept of optimum inflation. The European Central Bank adopted its value to be 
precisely ‘close to but below 2%’. And indeed, inflation between 2000 and 2008 
oscillated around 2%, but between 1998 and 1999 it was too low, and was thus unable 
to create the optimum conditions for the economy.  
 
Choosing the comparative period is another problem. In fact, the currency systems of 
the EU member states have never been developing in a completely free manner. Until 
1971, the Bretton Woods system was in use, after the termination of which the 
countries of the then EEC entered into currency cooperation concluding in the 
Maastricht Treaty that created the legal framework for the Economic and Monetary 
Union. In 1990s, the willingness to adopt the single currency – contingent on the 
fulfilling of the inflation criterion – imposed extraordinary actions on the member 
states aiming at limiting the increase in prices. The apogee of the anti-inflation policy 
came – as mentioned above – in 1998 and 1999 (Boyko, 2014). 
 
When analyzing inflationary processes, inflation and the aggregate and disaggregated 
levels should be singled out. In the former case, between 2000 and 2008 the price 
level oscillated within the boundaries of the inflation target (except for the already 
mentioned 2008), which proves that the ECB’s monetary policy was effective. The 
adoption of the inflation target at a level below 2% was quite a strict measure, 
markedly deviating from the analogous criteria used by many central banks in the 
times of their autonomy, i.e. prior to 1999. That was why, at the aggregated level, the 
adoption of the single currency alleviated inflationary pressure (Boyko, 2014; 
Castañeda et al., 2017). 
 
The situation appeared somewhat different at the disaggregated level, i.e. that of 
individual countries, especially those with the history of a higher inflation level, 
namely Spain, Portugal, Greece, and others. The perspective of future accession to the 
EMU accelerated their price convergence processes. After a period of ‘belt-
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tightening’, these states began to ‘loosen’ their strict anti-inflation criteria. In their 
memory (referred to as persistence), inflation became encoded at a far higher level 
(Caraballo et al., 2013). Hence, they could accept a higher increase in prices in the 
years 2000-2008, which resulted from, inter alia, overly expansive fiscal and lending 
policies pursued by commercial banks. It must be added that the assumptions of the 
EMU did not envisage a single fiscal policy or a European supervision over the 
banking activity, which turned out to be a mistake. Nevertheless, even the above-
average pick-up in inflation in the southern states of the euro area (Spain, Portugal 
Greece) does not stand as sufficient proof of the price-driving nature of the single 
currency. In an alternative scenario (which is discussed in the subsequent section 
hereof) that assumes the preservation of monetary autonomy, the level of prices in 
these states would have probably been even higher (Caraballo et al., 2013; Gomez-
Gonzalez et al., 2018).   
 
The growing price divergence in the euro area member states caused the lower and 
lower adequacy of the interest rate set by the ECB (Byrne et al., 2010). For the 
countries with an above-average increase in prices, the interest rate was too low, 
which was an additional factor stimulating inflationary processes. In this context, two 
observations come to mind. Firstly, if the states with excessive inflation had preserved 
their monetary independence, their central banks would have set higher interest rates. 
Secondly, the price divergence led to the coexistence of states with inflation levels 
above the inflation target with those with inflation levels below it. For the latter ones, 
the ECB’s interest rate might have been be too high, which meant there was downward 
pressure on prices. As an example, in Germany and France, the two largest euro area 
economies, inflation remained below 2% for a relatively long time (for seven years in 
Germany and six in France). Bearing in mind that in the aforementioned states prices 
diverged from the inflation target only slightly, inflation dispersion in the eurozone 
was not subject to much change, which is indicated by the standard deviation values 
(Figure 1).  
 
In the last of the analyzed sub-period, i.e. 2009-2019, in the euro area there was a 
decrease in and a simultaneous differentiation of prices. The price drop was associated 
with the economic downturn and was most noticeable in countries with the highest 
price levels in the previous sub-period, namely Spain, Greece, Portugal and – to a 
spectacular extent - Ireland (Strachinaru et al., 2019).  
 
This was particularly clear to see in the economic downturn years. Interestingly, in 
the first two of these states – despite the substantial drop in inflation – the average 
annual price growth rate continued to be higher than in, say, Germany or France. In 
Portugal it remained at the same level. Ireland, in turn, experienced the largest drop 
in prices of all the eurozone member states, which means that Ireland was the only 
country to improve its price competitiveness. This should not come as a surprise, 
accounting for its liberal economic model that is only slightly regulated. The 
adaptation processes in the Mediterranean states – due to their labor market rigidities 
– developed far more slowly. At the same time, the decline in the average annual 
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inflation in the euro area – with the unchanged value of the standard deviation – was 
evidence to a higher price volatility in the analyzed sub-period, which was linked to, 
inter alia, the aforementioned sudden drop in prices in Ireland. The divergence process 
was particularly visible in the first two years of this sub-period, namely 2009 and 
2010. The stabilization of the economic situation that set in in the subsequent years 
contributed to increased price stability.  
 
4. Inflationary Processes in Spain 
 
It can be concluded from the analysis conducted in the previous section hereof) that 
higher price growth rates after adopting the single currency occurred in states with a 
lower economic potential, namely in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. In the past, these 
countries had relatively higher levels of inflation than those found in other Western 
European states. 
 
An analysis of the inflationary processes in Spain required the singling out of a few 
sub-periods (Caraballo et al., 2013; Klimiuk, 2016; Gomez-Gonzalez et al., 2018). 
The first sub-period from 1990 to 1999 was characterized by a systematic decline in 
prices from 6.7% to 2.2%, i.e. by 4.5% (Figure 2). Such a substantial containment of 
inflation was made possible by the reforms carried out and the determination 
demonstrated by the central authorities. In 1994, Spain’s central bank won political 
and economic independence and introduced a direct inflation target – an effective tool 
for controlling price increases. The central authorities, in turn, increased fiscal 
discipline. Because of the actions undertaken in 1997-1998, Spain fulfilled the 
reference value of the inflation criterion and qualified for the third stage of the EMU 
(García-Cintado et al., 2016). Interestingly, Spain’s inflation levels between 1992 and 
1997 did not deviate considerably from the EU average, which shows that these 
actions were successful. 
 
The next sub-period from 1999 to 2008 was characterized by a pick-up in inflation in 
1999-2000, followed by stabilization with minor fluctuations until 2008. For most of 
this sub-period, Spain failed to fulfill the inflation criterion. Also, the disproportions 
between the prices in Spain and most eurozone member states increased. What caused 
the above-average growth in prices in Spain? It was both the inflation expectations 
and the inadequate lending and fiscal policies in response to the lower cost and the 
increased availability of capital, which will be discussed in more detail further on in 
the article. 
 
The last sub-period from 2009 to 2019 saw significant fluctuations of the level of 
inflation levels, although it did not deviate meaningfully from the aggregated index 
for the euro area. Although it can be noted that inflation in Spain reached higher 
extremes in the times of the lowest (2009) and the highest (2011) inflation, the country 
was generally able to fulfill the inflation criterion in times of a poorer economic 
situation. On the other hand, during periods of economic recovery prices were above 
the reference value. The price drop in Spain (in 2009 and 2011-2012) was caused by 
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the global crisis made worse by the losses sustained by the national banking system. 
The process of recovering competitiveness was hindered by the little flexibility of the 
labor market (evidence to which was the average annual price growth rate being 
higher than in it was Germany or France, as mentioned in the previous section). 
 
Figure 2. Inflationary processes in Spain compared with inflation in other euro area 
member states between 1990 and 2019 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat and ECB data. 
 
The central question at this moment appears to be whether the degree to which EMU 
membership affected the growth in prices. Or rather, whether prices in Spain would 
have behaved differently had the country remained outside the euro area. It is not easy 
to answer these questions. As mentioned in the previous section of this paper, the 
increase in prices between 1999 and 2008 itself does not yet confirm the price-driving 
nature of the euro. 
 
According to Gomez-Gonzalez and Ress (2018), in the alternative scenario – where 
Spain maintained its monetary policy independence – between 1999 and 2005 
inflation would have been somewhat lower (by a few tenths of one percent on an 
annual average), and between 2006 and 2013 its level would have been significantly 
higher (by even a few percentage points annually). Consequently, the cumulative 
inflation rate between 1999 and 2013 would have been higher than it was. Therefore, 
Spain’s submission to the regime of the ECB’s single monetary policy decreased its 
inflation. In turn, Caraballo and Dabús (2013) estimated the optimum inflation for 
Spain between 1999 and 2013 to be 4%, which was determined by higher inflation 
expectations. Maintaining price stability at any other level – either lower or higher – 
would have been more difficult and generate higher costs for the economy to bear. In 
this context, the ECB’s inflation target (close to but below 2%) was inadequate to the 
Spanish economy. Between 1999 and 2008, i.e. the period of an intensive increase in 
prices, the average annual inflation rate in Spain was 3.1%. Thus, it was lower than 
the optimum value estimated by the aforementioned authors, although it exceeded the 
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Why would preservation of monetary autonomy by Spain have entailed a higher price 
level? This would have been the result of the price mechanism for restoring 
macroeconomic equilibrium. In the past, the peseta’s devaluation was able to boost 
the economy’s competitiveness by increasing export earnings with a simultaneous 
reduction in imports resulting from increased prices of goods brought from abroad. 
This process was automatic and continuous and took place without state interference.  
 
However, while part of the monetary union, Spain’s economy requires the so-called 
internal devaluation, namely wage reductions, to improve its competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, wages usually grow in good economic times, thus reducing the 
competitiveness of the economy even further. On the other hand, in times of economic 
downturn the restoration of international equilibrium requires considerable labor 
market flexibility. By way of an example, it is estimated that in the alternative scenario 
the years from 2009 to 2013 would have witnessed a 20% devaluation of the peseta. 
While part of the euro area, the same effect would have required a 20% wage 
reduction, which – accounting for the labor market rigidities in Spain – would be 
unrealistic (Gomez-Gonzalez et al., 2018). From the psychological point of view, as 
well, it is easier to restore the competitiveness of the economy by increasing prices 
and keeping wages unaffected (external devaluation, i.e. the devaluation of the 
national currency), than by reducing wages and keeping prices unaffected (internal 
devaluation where there is no national currency). Despite the different public 
perceptions, both these cases may lead to a comparable reduction of household 
purchasing power. 
 
Moreover, the ‘rigidity’ of Spain’s labor market, paradoxically, made it easier to 
restore competitiveness (the periodicity of wage bargaining delayed wage increases, 
thereby extending the economy’s competitiveness initiated with currency 
devaluation). The adoption of the single currency reversed this situation; conversely, 
the periodicity of wage bargaining delayed the process of reducing wages necessary 
to improve the competitiveness of the economy. Improving the position of Spain’s 
economy, therefore, required a thorough labor market reform. It must be noted, as 
well, that in the alternative scenarios Spain would have entered the crisis with a higher 
interest rate, and thus would have had a batter capability of affecting the economic 
processes. Importantly, in response to the crisis the ECB cut the key interest rate down 
to zero which, however, was an insufficient move. Consequently, the bank was forced 
to apply unconventional monetary policy tools, an issue discussed in the next section 
hereof. 
 
5. Factors Determining Inflationary Processes in Spain 
 
The Monetary Policy: 
Monetary policies are aimed at ensuring price stability. They are managed by central 
banks by affecting the volume of money supply (cost of loans) and the level of the 
currency exchange rates. This sub-section discusses the factors that affect the cost of 
loans in Spain. Figure 3 shows the level of the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate 
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and the inflation target for Spain’s economy between 1990 and 2019. 
 
Figure 3. Interest rates in Spain between 1990 and 2019 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat and ECB data.   
 
Between 1990 and 1998 the level of the nominal interest rate set by Spain’s Central 
Bank (CB) exceeded the inflation rate, while at the same time the values of both these 
variables kept falling. However, since the nominal interest rate cutting cycle ran faster 
than the decline in inflation, the resultant value of the real interest rate kept dropping. 
The decreasing difference between the nominal interest rate and inflation was made 
possible by introducing a restrictive fiscal policy, which was in turn determined by 
Spain’s upcoming membership in the EMU. As a result of this, already in 1997 
inflation fell below the Spanish CB’s inflation target (close to but below 3%), and the 
reference value for the price criterion. There were two serious consequences of the 
changes that were affecting the monetary policy. Firstly, they caused the cost of loans 
to drop (the nominal interest rate decreased from almost 15% in 1990 to less than 4% 
in 1998). Secondly, they lowered people’s inclination to save money (the real interest 
rate decreased from over 8% in 1990 to less than 2% in 1998).  
 
Therefore, favorable conditions for ensuring an increase in consumer demand and, 
consequently, a growth in prices, were created. Spain’s accession to the eurozone only 
deepened the aforementioned phenomena (Byrne et al., 2010; Carballo-Cruz, 2011). 
During that time, the ECB’s nominal interest rate decreased (particularly from 2001 
to 2004), while inflation grew. As a result of this, the cost of money fell to Spain’s 
historic low, which led to credit expansion. The value of the real interest rate, 
however, stayed at a negative level for an extended period, which decreased the 
already low inclination to save money. Interestingly, during the crisis period (except 
for 2009 that saw a deep drop in inflation), the interest rates (both nominal and real) 
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The Lending Policy: 
The lowering of the cost of credit itself is not an unwelcome phenomenon, provided 
that economic equilibrium is maintained in the market (Carballo-Cruz, 2011; Drakos 
et al., 2020). Spain’s accession to the euro area decreased the cost of money and 
increased confidence in the economy. Hence, a wide stream of cheap capital started 
to flow into the country – it is estimated that nearly 70% of the value of the loans 
granted came from foreign capital (García-Cintado et al., 2016). Obviously, there is 
nothing wrong about that, provided that an appropriate lending policy is observed, 
which – unfortunately – was not the case in Spain (Merikas et al., 2012). A 
considerable part of the banking sector was not subject to regulation by the national 
financial supervision system (particularly savings banks, the so-called Cajas de 
Ahorros), the weight of which accounted for approx. 50% of the entire sector 
(Morcate, 2017).  
 
The lack of supervision led to credit expansion that especially affected the real estate 
market, as mortgage loans for households accounted for approx. 80%-90% of the 
volume of the banks’ loan portfolio. The faith in an uninterrupted growth in house 
prices dulled bankers’ vigilance as they started to offer loans on more and more 
preferential terms, for instance without down-payment, or to persons with low 
creditworthiness. The demand for mortgage loans was generated by the increasing 
affluence of the Spanish society, and by an intensive influx of foreigners. It is 
estimated that between 1997 and 2007 Spain admitted approx. 4.5 immigrants, who 
influenced the demand side of the real estate market (Poggi, 2019). Another group 
that had an impact on this market was that of the so-called non-residents, namely 
people buying real estate for tourist purposes alone. With the low-interest bank 
deposits, the real estate market experiencing an above-average price growth became 
an attractive form of capital investment.  
 
Thus, a significant portion of the demand in the real estate market had a speculative 
nature (the surplus of the available residential real estate over the country’s 
demographic needs was estimated at approx. 40%). The Spanish government actively 
promoted an economic growth model based on real estate development (Gorgolas, 
2019). The labor-intensive industries were supposed to absorb the surplus low-
qualified labor force that is so characteristic of the Spanish labor market. The easy 
and cheap loans led to a growth in household debt. Between 1999 and 2007, household 
debt relative to disposable income grew in Spain from 80% to nearly 150%, i.e. almost 
twice (Figure 4).  
 
The growing demand that began to exceed the production capacity of the construction 
industry contributed to an above-average price growth (Loungani, 2008; Gorgolas, 
2019). The inflationary processes were favored by the monopolized structure of the 
economy and the already mentioned inflexibility of the labor market. Consequently, 
the growing wages in Spain’s economy could not keep pace with productivity at work, 
because of which the country was put at a competitive disadvantage. 
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Figure 4. Spain’s household debt in 1999-2019 
Source: Developed by the authors based on OECD data. 
 
The economic upturn found not only in Spain but in fact across the entire euro area 
encouraged the ECB to raise interest rates. The interest rate hiking cycle started in 
2005 brought the cost of credit to a higher level. As a result of that, demand for new 
loans fell, and the debt servicing costs borne by the existing borrowers grew. Some of 
the least reliable borrowers stopped repaying their loans, which caused banks to start 
seizing houses. Suddenly, the housing market situation reversed. The demand fell 
below the production capacity of the over-expanded construction industry – at the 
peak of the economic upturn the share of the construction industry together with its 
auxiliary industries in the GDP and in employment grew by 25% and 23%, 
respectively (Tamames, 2009). The drop in demand was accompanied by a drop in 
house prices. Unfortunately for the banks, the prices fell below the values of the loans, 
which was one result of their irresponsible lending policy. Consequently, numerous 
bankruptcies of developer firms and the losses sustained by the financial sector threw 
the country into a crisis (Gorgolas, 2019). The burst of the speculative bubble led to a 
sudden decline in prices, and to deflation in 2009 – a critical year for the economy. 
 
The Fiscal Policy: 
Another factor likely to affect inflationary processes in a monetary union is fiscal 
policy encompassing a number of instruments that influence the level of income and 
the volume of budget expenditure, such as taxes, government deficit, government debt 
and loan guarantees issued to businesses. Contrary to the opinions held by many 
observers (Carballo-Cruz, 2011; Gomez-Gonzalez et al., 2018), Spain’s authorities 
were not always carrying out a budgetary policy preventing inflationary processes, as 
reported by, inter alia, Serrano (2010) and Ferreiro et al. (2013). The budget surpluses, 
or the slight budget deficits, were to be an argument in favor of the thesis that a proper 
fiscal policy direction was adopted for the years 1999-2008.  
 
However, a budget surplus does not always equal fiscal restriction, just as a budget 
deficit does not have to equal fiscal expansion. The structural balance that accounts 
for budget revenue and expenditure in times of economic development based on full 
utilization of the economic potential is a measure commonly used to determine the 
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the utilization of a country’s economic potential), the government balance and the 
structural balance in Spain. A positive output gap signifies an economy during an 
upturn trend and usually means a growing GDP.  
 
Figure 5. The state of public finances in Spain between 1999 and 2019 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat and AMECO data. 
 
The Figure shows that economic recovery in Spain took place between 1999 and 2008. 
During that time, the initial budget deficit turned into a surplus. The line outlined by 
the output gap demonstrating the real output in comparison with the potential output 
is interesting, as well. Its changing inclination reflects the nature of the fiscal policy: 
a positive inclination denotes an improvement in the state of public finances resulting 
from a tightened fiscal policy, while a negative inclination denotes a downturn in the 
state of public finances resulting from fiscal expansion. Even though between 1999 
and 2004 and in 2008 the budget showed a deficit, which might denote expansion, in 
fact the policy pursued between 2000 and 2003 adopted a restrictive nature. In turn, 
the budget surplus of 2005-2007 might be indicative of restriction, but in 2007 the 
policy adopted an expansive direction. In summary, 5 years out of the 10 years of the 
economic upturn saw fiscal policy expansion, which had a stimulating effect on price 
growth. 
 
The pro-cyclic nature of the fiscal policy overheated the economy and thus deepened 
the 2009-2013 economic downturn. Another consequence of the improper fiscal 
policy (especially the overexpansion of 2007-2008) was that the capability of 
supporting the economy during the downturn was limited. Chapter 5 shows that the 
fiscal policy adopted an expansive nature only in the first year of the crisis – 2009. 
The excessive budget deficit and, first, the growing government debt, forced the 
government to tighten its fiscal policy, thus delaying the economic recovery 
(Magkonis et al., 2019).   
 
6. The Development of Inflationary Processes in Poland in the Monetary 
Integration Context   
 
The inflationary processes in Poland between 1999 and 2019 attesting to the 
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inflation was observed in 1999-2001, which was a result of the hyperinflation of the 
1990s. In turn, the decline in inflation observed in the subsequent years was a 
consequence of economic stagnation. However, a turning point for Poland’s monetary 
policy came with the adoption in 2004 of the inflation targets of 2.5% with the 
deviation range of +/- 1% (Grostal et al., 2015). The aim of setting an inflation target 
was to facilitate fulfilling the price convergence criterion under the Maastricht Treaty. 
In this context, it should be noted that the inflation target was set at 0.5% above the 
same target for the euro area, which was a consequence of Poland’s higher price 
growth rate. As for the deviation range, the reason for setting it as such was due to the 
instability of the inflationary processes occurring in Poland. Thus, the upper allowable 
value of inflation was set at 3.5%, i.e. 1.5% above the ECB’s inflation target.  
 
Between 2004 and 2019, inflation in Poland became stable around the inflation target 
and only slightly fluctuated beyond the accepted deviation range. It demonstrated 
larger fluctuations than the aggregated indicator for the eurozone. Prices, however, 
were changing in line with the trends set by the inflationary processes happening in 
the euro area, which is evidence of a far-reaching convergence of the economies from 
the two currency areas. The average annual price growth rate in Poland between 2004 
(i.e. the year the inflation target was adopted) and 2019 was 2.1%, while it was 1.6% 
in the euro area between 1999 and 2019 (i.e. the period after the creation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union). The 0.5% difference was exactly the difference 
between the values of the inflation targets. 
 
Figure 6.   Inflation in Poland compared to the inflation indicators for the euro area 
between 1999 and 2019 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat and ECB data. 
 
Based on the course of the Figure 6 curves it can be found that Poland fulfilled the 
inflation criterion under the Maastricht Treaty for a period of nine years. Bearing in 
mind that, it fact, there has never been any political consent to the adoption of the euro 
and, therefore, no extraordinary actions aiming at ensuring the fulfilment of the 
inflation criterion, the national monetary authorities should have no difficulty in the 
future with stabilizing prices at levels below the reference value. However, the 
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observing in Poland in recent times) and the tensions in the domestic labor market that 
have been present for a few years now, may have an impact on the development of 
inflationary processes. Prices in December 2019 grew to the level of 3.4%, in January 
2020 to the level of 4.4% and in February to the level of 4.7%. What was worse, that 
price growth was mainly caused by core inflation, the source of which should be 
sought in the demand side of the economy, i.e. overconsumption.  
 
7. Factors Increasing the Risk of w Pick-Up in Inflation in Poland in The 
Event of Adopting the Euro 
 
The Monetary Policy: 
It seems that the differences between the national interest rate and the common rate 
for the euro area will be of major importance in the course of inflationary processes 
after the adoption of the European currency. Figure 7 present the values of the NBP 
(National Bank of Poland)’s nominal interest rate, inflation and the resultant of these 
two, i.e. the real interest rate. A look at the course of the curves shows that over the 
analyzed period the real interest rate was positive, except for the years 2009-2011 and 
2017-2019. In 2009-2011, the negative real interest rates were owed to a pick-up in 
inflation resulting from the depreciation of the zloty. The monetary authorities of that 
time responded to the price growth by elevating the nominal interest rate, which 
decreased inflation and brought the real interest rate back to aa positive path. The 
second period with negative real interest rates commenced in 2017. According to the 
announcements of the current NBP authorities, the nominal interest rates will remain 
as they are until 2022. With an unchanged level of prices – or even with increased 
prices, which should be expected according to some Polish economists – the real 
interest rates will stay negative. 
 
Figure 7. Interest rates in Poland between 1999 and 2019    
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat and NBP data.  
 
The recent coronavirus pandemic (March 2020) has necessitated monetary policy 
modifications. The monetary authorities have lowered the nominal interest rate by 
0.5% (from 1.5% to 1.0%) and introduced non-standard monetary policy tools aimed 
at limiting adverse effects of the crisis. Namely, open market operations have been 
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minimum reserves for commercial banks was lowered. There is no consensus among 
experts as to what the long-term effects of these actions will be. 
 
It should be noted that in the years 2004-2019 the average annual ECB interest rate 
was 1.2%, and the NBP interest rate was 3.3%. Despite the convergence of interest 
rates between the euro area and Poland, it should be expected that Poland's currency 
integration will mean adopting a lower interest rate.  
 
The Lending Policy: 
The lending policy is one of the two pillars the use of which can help exert an influence 
on inflationary processes in absence of monetary autonomy. A vast majority of the 
Polish banking system is subject to state control through the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority (KNF). Restrictive recommendations from the supervisory 
body prevent an excessively expansive lending policy that could threaten stability of 
the financial system. Still, however, Poland’s household debt is expanding, as 
evidenced by the growing number and value of loans granted (KNF, 2019). This leads 
to growing liabilities on the part of the private sector, as shown by household debt 
relative to disposable income, a ratio that grew six-fold over a twenty-year period to 
reach over 63% in 2018 (Figure 8). This value is comparable to Spain’s household 
debt prior to 1999. Certainly, there is nothing wrong about private sector debt, 
provided there is no threat to loan repayment, a factor that depends on, inter alia, the 
existence of a safety buffer in the form of disposable income which is larger the more 
wealthy the society is.  
 
Figure 8. Poland’s household debt between 1999 and 2018 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on OECD data.  
 
The increasing household debt is contributed to by the NBP’s low interest rate policy, 
which reduces the society’s inclination to save money in bank accounts. Hence, 
investors are looking out for higher rates of return on capital and investing their spare 
funds in, for instance, the real estate market. A surge in demand for houses faced with 
shortages in supply causes the expansion of a speculative bubble (Wilkowicz, 2020; 
Ziemba, 2020), which is confirmed by the course of the curves in Figure 9. 
Importantly, the house price growth rate is far higher than inflation – over the last few 
quarters the difference being approx. 6.0%. Another concern is the maintained 
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purchasing power of households in the real estate market has been falling for three 
months now.  
 
Figure 9. House price growth rate in Poland between 2016 and 2019 (quarterly) 
 
Source: Developed by the authors based on Eurostat and GUS data. 
 
The Fiscal Policy: 
The fiscal policy is an essential pillar likely to influence the development of 
inflationary processes in the context of a loss of monetary independence. Between 
1999 and 2019, the state of public finances varied and was largely subject to 
fluctuations in the economic situation (Figure 10).  
 
Throughout the entire analyzed period, both the government balance and the structural 
balance showed deficits. The latter of the two indicators is of particular importance, 
because the negative structural balance suggests that even with complete utilization 
of the economic potential public finances deviated from equilibrium. 
 
Figure 10. State of public finances in Poland between 1999 and 2019 
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Even during the economic upturn of 2016-2019, where the output gap grew to nearly 
2%, the structural balance was negative. The year 2019, which saw a downturn in the 
state of public finances, should be taken note of. Fiscal expansion increased the budget 
deficit to -0.6%, and the structural deficit to -2.2%. Excessive budget expenditure was 




Will prices grow after Poland adopts the single currency as a result of asymmetric 
shocks? For the Polish economy, monetary integration will mean that a lower nominal 
interest rate will need to be adopted, which may cause prices to grow (Borowski, 
2001). Here, a clear analogy can be observed to the situation that Spain was in during 
the first few years of its Economic and Monetary Union membership, i.e. a 
mismatched interest rate of the ECB and a resulting increase in inflation (Carballo-
Cruz, 2011).  
 
However, there are also clear differences there, as well (Figures 11 and 12). It appears 
that Poland’s inflation has stabilized in a more natural manner, without the pressure 
to quickly integrate with the euro are. This could be a factor limiting inflation 
expectations following the adoption of the single currency (factor 1). Another 
difference is that relating to the labor market.  
 
Spain entered the eurozone with considerable reserve of unused labor force (its 
unemployment rate was nearly 16% in 1999). As a matter of fact, the supply side 
could not catch up with the demand (stimulated by the easy and cheap loan), but was 
partly able to neutralize the growing prices by increasing its potential (by the time of 
the peak of the economic upturn in 2007, Spain’s unemployment rate had fallen to 
almost 8%).  
 
However, Poland’s labor force resources have been practically exhausted, as 
evidenced by the unemployment rate that fell to nearly 3.0% in 2019. Under such 
circumstances, after adopting the single currency lower interest rates – without 
appropriate adjustments on the part of the fiscal and lending policies – could lead to 
an uncontrolled pick-up in inflation. An accruing macroeconomic imbalance might 
cause an economic crisis.  
 
Wages would need to be reduced in order to improve competitiveness, but although 
the Polish labor market is more flexible than the Spanish one, this could be difficult 
to achieve due to the complete exhaustion of the domestic labor force resources. This 
issue is depicted, as mentioned, in Figures 11 and 12, which present the correlations 
between the country’s internal policy (factor 1), psychological factors (factor 2) and 
the adoption of the euro (factor 3). The Figures also show the role of the adjustment 
factor in the form of the labor market.  
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Figure 11. Asymmetric shock in the Spanish economy (1999 – 2013)  
 
Note: The darker the shade of the arrows the larger the factor’s effect. 
Source: Developed by the authors. 
 
An asymmetric shock affecting the development of inflationary processes may have 
its roots in the fiscal policy (factor 1). Poland’s public finances are in a far worse state 
than those of Spain during its economic prosperity of 1999-2008, which may influence 
inflationary processes after the euro is adopted. Monetary integration with the euro 
area, with the fiscal expansion continuing at the same level as it has so far, will 
undoubtedly lead to a growth in prices. However, contrary to Spain, that growth may 
be even higher due to the aforementioned labor market tensions (Klimiuk, 2016; 
Dallago, 2016).  
 
Under such circumstances, with the assumption that the economic upturn will remain 
at the same level, any lowering of the price growth risk will require a tighter fiscal 
policy, i.e. by limiting budget expenditure and/or raising taxes. Curbing expenditure 
will not be an easy task because most of it (over 80%) is of the so-called ‘statutory’ 
nature. Also, this variant is less preferable from the point of view of social policy, 
although due to the already excessive budget expenditure to the GDP ratio it would 
be more beneficial for the economy. An increase in taxes would be a far worse 
solution, especially that it would soon cause an increase in prices and, thus, exacerbate 
the inflationary processes.  
 
The labor market is a factor used for adjusting asymmetric shocks. In Spain, it failed 
to do its job because there was no social consent to wage reductions (Gorgolas, 2019). 
A similar situation can be expected to happen in Poland, which is why it has been 
found that after Poland’s adoption of the euro the main determinants of price growth 
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Figure 12. Scenario for asymmetric shock after Poland’s adoption of the euro 
 
Note: The darker the shade of the arrows the larger the factor’s effect 
Source: Developed by the authors.  
 
It appears that Poland’s monetary integration with the euro area will increase the 
financial sector’s credit expansion (factor 3), which will be a consequence of adopting 
a lower interest rate (as mentioned above) and the inflow of foreign capital. Without 
a doubt, this will boost an upward pressure on prices, while the construction industry 
(with more than 70% of the worth of all loans granted) will be particularly exposed to 
overheating – a situation where the supply side is unable to meet consumers’ growing 
needs. The Polish real estate market is already (i.e. early 2020) beginning to resemble 
that of Spain from 1999-2008. The country is experiencing a short supply of houses, 
which combined with the growing affluence of the society is stimulating demand 
(Jędrzyński, 2020).  
 
Like in Spain, Poland has recently admitted more than 2 million economic immigrants 
who are exerting growing pressure on the housing rental market. Where interest rates 
are low and the house prices are growing, the real estate market offering an above-
average rate of return is becoming an attractive investment target. This equally applies 
to investments financed with one’s own funds and those funded with loans. In the 
latter case, the debt servicing costs are lower than the income from the rental of flats 
and houses. Additionally, the price growth is being exacerbated by the weakness of 
the supply side, i.e. the already mentioned short supply in the labor market and the 
specificity of the construction process (a long cycle of completion of construction 
projects). However, price growth after the adoption of the euro can be prevented in 
Poland by introducing stricter terms for granting loans. This task will be far easier 
than it was in Spain thanks to the strong supervision over the financial sector in Poland 
(NBP, 2009; Schönwitz, 2014; Gomez-Gonzalez et al., 2018). 
 
A summary of the above considerations authorizes the statement that Poland’s 
accession to the euro area may contribute to an increase in prices. When compared 
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with Spain, lower inflation expectations and deeper financial supervision over the 
banking sector will be factors limiting price growth. On the other hand, the fiscal 
policy with excessive government expenditure will be a risk factor. Labor force 
shortages, as well, will exacerbate inflation impulses more than they did in Spain. 
Therefore, the authors of this article recommend that Poland applies a combination of 
restrictive fiscal and credit policies. 
 
Finally, the question arises of whether the Polish currency is effective at restoring the 
macroeconomic equilibrium. The significance of the Polish zloty is far lower than that 
of the former Spanish peseta, which is due to the deepening problems within the Polish 
labor market. The almost complete exhaustion of the labor force resources will lead 
to an upward pressure on wages to compensate for the growth in prices of imported 
goods. It should be remembered, though, that the effects of devaluation are also 
dependent on the degree of the economy’s openness and the flexibility of exports and 
imports to exchange rate variations. The lower significance of devaluation in restoring 
macroeconomic equilibrium is an argument in favor of considering whether the zloty 




Without a doubt, the single European currency has contributed to a decline in 
inflation, although it is difficult to determine the exact scale of the currency’s anti-
inflation effect on the economy. The present analysis of statistical data showed that 
the perspective of monetary integration itself reduced inflation expectations, 
especially in countries with traditionally high price levels. In the first period of the 
Economic and Monetary Union’s operation (1999-2008), the single currency 
contributed to price convergence at the aggregated level. Nevertheless, some countries 
witnessed an increase in prices that considerably deviated from the ECB’s inflation 
target.  One of these countries was Spain, which showed many similarities with the 
Polish economy. The price increase in Spain was a consequence of macroeconomic 
imbalances, i.e. excess demand over supply, the source of which were higher inflation 
expectations, expansive credit policy and excessive budget expenditure.  
 
The inability to regulate inflationary processes particularly visible in the construction 
sector. The growing prices were limiting the economy’s using interest rates 
contributed to the overheating of the economy, which was competitiveness, while the 
real estate bubble burst brought the country into recession. Additionally, labor market 
rigidities delayed adaptation processes, simultaneously leading to an increase in 
unemployment and exacerbating the economic downturn. 
 
In many aspects, Poland resembles Spain’s economy in the first decade of the 21st 
century. It is equally exposed to the risk of asymmetric shocks occurring after the 
adoption of the euro. However, in Poland inflation has stabilized itself at a lower level 
in a more natural manner, and its level does not deviate much from the ECB’s inflation 
target. A milder course of inflationary processes diminishes the significance of the 
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domestic currency in restoring international equilibrium and reduces the risk of 
increasing prices after the adoption of the single currency. However, credit expansion 
resulting from adopting a lower interest rate may cause the danger of a pick-up in 
inflation. The real estate market, which is already experiencing a deepening 
imbalance, will be especially susceptible to price growth. The building up of the 
speculative bubble is accompanied by a low cost of credit, an increase in the 
purchasing power of households and the inflow of economic immigrants, much as it 
was in Spain. The pro-cyclic nature of the fiscal policy may offer an additional boost 
to the increase in prices. The labor market, due to the complete exhaustion of the 
domestic labor force resources and the high pressure on wages may, in turn, delay 
Poland’s economy’s recovery from a potential crisis.  
 
Therefore, efforts to prevent excessive inflationary impulses will require an 
appropriate adjustment on the part of the lending and/or fiscal policies, that the authors 
of this article recommend. The Polish economic policy’s asset is in the strong 
supervision over the baking industry, which was what Spain lacked. The imposition 
of additional restrictions on the financial sector may limit credit expansion. However, 
the situation does not look equally promising in the case of public finances, which are 
strongly affected by the current political climate. 
 
Considering all the pros and cons, it appears that Poland should take advantage of the 
opportunities that monetary integration brings with it. However, the country must not 
make the mistakes that brought euro area countries into a crisis before. Although the 
European currency was not directly to blame for the growth in prices, it facilitated and 
accelerated the build-up of inflationary processes, simultaneously delaying the 
economies’ recovery from the period of downturn. This is what Poland needs to take 
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